Agent security and prompt injection

Part of the benchmark canon: 1 published, 1 queued next, 6 not yet run. How to read the Paladin column is defined on the canon page.

BenchmarkOrganizationMeasuresPaladin
InjecAgent (top 12)UIUC Kang Lab1,054 indirect prompt-injection cases against tool-using agentsResults published
AgentDojo (top 12)ETH Zurich / Invariant LabsUtility and injection resilience for tool-using agents, scored jointlyQueued next
AgentHarm (top 12)Gray Swan AI / UK AISIAgent harmfulness when the user is the attackerNot yet run
Agent Red Teaming (ART)Gray Swan AIHigh-impact attacks curated from a large public competitionNot yet run
SHADE-ArenaAnthropicSabotage and monitoring across 29 agent environmentsNot yet run
BIPIAMicrosoftIndirect prompt-injection attacks and defensesNot yet run
Tensor TrustUC BerkeleyPrompt extraction and hijacking, drawn from a public gameNot yet run
BrowserARTGray Swan AIRed-teaming for browser agentsNot yet run

Next: Cyber offense and CTF.